Regulating Corruption Through Free Trade Agreements: An Analysis of the NAFTA 2.0 Anti-corruption Provisions by Chijioke-Oforji, C
 Chijioke-Oforji, C
 Regulating Corruption Through Free Trade Agreements: An Analysis of the 
NAFTA 2.0 Anti-corruption Provisions
http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/id/eprint/11314/
Article
LJMU has developed LJMU Research Online for users to access the research output of the 
University more effectively. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by 
the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of 
any article(s) in LJMU Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or 
any commercial gain.
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of the record. 
Please see the repository URL above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
For more information please contact researchonline@ljmu.ac.uk
http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/
Citation (please note it is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you 
intend to cite from this work) 
Chijioke-Oforji, C (2019) Regulating Corruption Through Free Trade 
Agreements: An Analysis of the NAFTA 2.0 Anti-corruption Provisions. 
Transnational Dispute Management. ISSN 1875-4120 
LJMU Research Online
 Transnational Dispute Management 
www.transnational-dispute-management.com
:
:
:
ISSN 
Issue  
Published  
1875-4120 
(Provisional) 
  
About TDM 
TDM7UDQVQDWLRQDO'LVSXWH0DQDJHPHQW)RFXVLQJRQUHFHQW 
GHYHORSPHQWVLQWKHDUHDRI,QYHVWPHQWDUELWUDWLRQDQG'LVSXWH 
0DQDJHPHQWUHJXODWLRQWUHDWLHVMXGLFLDODQGDUELWUDOFDVHV 
YROXQWDU\JXLGHOLQHVWD[DQGFRQWUDFWLQJ
9LVLWZZZWUDQVQDWLRQDOGLVSXWHPDQDJHPHQWFRP 
IRUIXOO7HUPV	&RQGLWLRQVDQGVXEVFULSWLRQUDWHV
Open to all to read and to contribute 
7'0KDVEHFRPHWKHKXERIDJOREDOSURIHVVLRQDODQGDFDGHPLF 
QHWZRUN7KHUHIRUHZHLQYLWHDOOWKRVHZLWKDQLQWHUHVWLQ 
,QYHVWPHQWDUELWUDWLRQDQG'LVSXWH0DQDJHPHQWWRFRQWULEXWH 
:HDUHORRNLQJPDLQO\IRUVKRUWFRPPHQWVRQUHFHQW 
GHYHORSPHQWVRIEURDGLQWHUHVW:HZRXOGOLNHZKHUHSRVVLEOHIRU 
VXFKFRPPHQWVWREHEDFNHGXSE\SURYLVLRQRILQGHSWKQRWHV 
DQGDUWLFOHVZKLFKZHZLOOEHSXEOLVKHGLQRXU
NQRZOHGJHEDQN
 
DQGSULPDU\OHJDODQGUHJXODWRU\PDWHULDOV
,I\RXZRXOGOLNHWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKLVJOREDOQHWZRUNSOHDVH 
FRQWDFWXVDWLQIR#WUDQVQDWLRQDOGLVSXWHPDQDJHPHQWFRPZH 
DUHUHDG\WRSXEOLVKUHOHYDQWDQGTXDOLW\FRQWULEXWLRQVZLWK 
QDPHSKRWRDQGEULHIELRJUDSKLFDOGHVFULSWLRQEXWZHZLOODOVR 
DFFHSWDQRQ\PRXVRQHVZKHUHWKHUHLVDJRRGUHDVRQ:HGR 
QRWH[SHFWFRQWULEXWRUVWRSURGXFHORQJDFDGHPLFDUWLFOHV 
WKRXJKZHSXEOLVKDVHOHFWQXPEHURIDFDGHPLFVWXGLHVHLWKHU 
DVDQDGYDQFHYHUVLRQRUDQ7'0IRFXVHGUHSXEOLFDWLRQEXW 
UDWKHUFRQFLVHFRPPHQWVIURPWKHDXWKRU
VSURIHVVLRQDO 
·ZRUNVKRS·
TDMLVOLQNHGWROGEMIDWKHSULQFLSDOLQWHUQHWLQIRUPDWLRQ	 
GLVFXVVLRQIRUXPLQWKHDUHDRIRLOJDVHQHUJ\PLQLQJ 
LQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGLQYHVWPHQWGLVSXWHVIRXQGHGE\ 
3URIHVVRU7KRPDV:lOGH
September 2019
7HUPV	&RQGLWLRQV
5HJLVWHUHG7'0XVHUVDUHDXWKRULVHGWRGRZQORDGDQG
SULQWRQHFRS\RIWKHDUWLFOHVLQWKH7'0:HEVLWHIRU
SHUVRQDOQRQFRPPHUFLDOXVHSURYLGHGDOOSULQWRXWV
FOHDUO\LQFOXGHWKHQDPHRIWKHDXWKRUDQGRI7'07KH
ZRUNVRGRZQORDGHGPXVWQRWEHPRGLILHG&RSLHV
GRZQORDGHGPXVWQRWEHIXUWKHUFLUFXODWHG(DFK
LQGLYLGXDOZLVKLQJWRGRZQORDGDFRS\PXVWILUVWUHJLVWHU
ZLWKWKHZHEVLWH
$OORWKHUXVHLQFOXGLQJFRS\LQJGLVWULEXWLRQ
UHWUDQVPLVVLRQRUPRGLILFDWLRQRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQRU
PDWHULDOVFRQWDLQHGKHUHLQZLWKRXWWKHH[SUHVVZULWWHQ
FRQVHQWRI7'0LVVWULFWO\SURKLELWHG6KRXOGWKHXVHU
FRQWUDYHQHWKHVHFRQGLWLRQV7'0UHVHUYHWKHULJKWWR
VHQGDELOOIRUWKHXQDXWKRULVHGXVHWRWKHSHUVRQRU
SHUVRQVHQJDJLQJLQVXFKXQDXWKRULVHGXVH7KHELOOZLOO
FKDUJHWRWKHXQDXWKRULVHGXVHUDVXPZKLFKWDNHVLQWR
DFFRXQWWKHFRS\ULJKWIHHDQGDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRVWVRI
LGHQWLI\LQJDQGSXUVXLQJWKHXQDXWKRULVHGXVHU
)RUPRUHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKH7HUPV	&RQGLWLRQVYLVLW
ZZZWUDQVQDWLRQDOGLVSXWHPDQDJHPHQWFRP
&RS\ULJKW7'09
7'0&RYHUY3
This article will be published in a
IXWXUHLVVXHRI7'09&KHFN
ZHEVLWHIRUILQDOSXEOLFDWLRQGDWH
IRUFRUUHFWUHIHUHQFH
This article may not be the final
version and should be considered
 as a draft article.
Regulating Corruption Through Free Trade
Agreements: An Analysis of the NAFTA 2.0
Anti-corruption Provisions
by C. Chijioke-Oforji
This paper will be part of the TDM Special Issue on "The United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)". More information here. 
1 
 
Regulating Corruption Through Free Trade Agreements:  
An Analysis of the NAFTA 2.0 Anti-corruption Provisions 
Dr Chijioke Chijioke-Oforji.1 
Abstract 
The recently unveiled United States, Mexico and Canada free trade agreement (USMCA) has 
generated considerable interest in academic and policymaking circles owing to a troubled 
negotiating history. In many respects, the conclusion of the agreement provides a welcome 
reprieve for the most dedicated followers of its negotiation. Far from harming trade relations 
between the North American neighbours, the agreement in its current form is likely to inspire 
new opportunities for cooperation in a number of areas. One area of increased cooperation is 
Anti-corruption where the agreement codifies a number of measures that are of potential 
benefit to its signatories. This article examines the USMCA anti-corruption provisions and 
connects it to an emergent trend of anti-corruption regulation through free trade agreements 
(FTAs).  
I. Introduction 
Almost three decades after the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA),2 a successor agreement has been negotiated by its signatories. The new agreement 
known as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) or NAFTA 2.0 comes 
against a background of infighting and protectionist rhetoric.3 Notwithstanding this troubled 
history, the USMCA provides several reasons for optimism.  
First, the agreement maintains vital trade and investment links across North America by further 
reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment.4 The agreement also modernises 
its predecessor in a number of areas including labour rights, environmental protection, 
regulatory cooperation, digital trade and Anti-Corruption among others.5  
 
1 The author is a Lecturer in Law at Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK and can be reached via 
C.C.ChijiokeOforji@ljmu.ac.uk  
2 North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 and 605 (1993). 
3 Ana Isabel Martinez, David Lawder ‘U.S. businesses fear NAFTA doomed; Mexico warns of consequences’ 
Reuters (10 October 2017) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta/u-s-businesses-fear-nafta-doomed-
mexico-warns-of-consequences-idUSKBN1CF0WV> Accessed 20 April 2019.  
4 United States International Trade Commission ‘U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement: Likely Impact on the 
U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors’ (April 2019) 
<https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4889.pdf> Accessed 20 May 2019. 
5 Franz Christian Ebert and Pedro A. Villarreal ‘the Renegotiated “NAFTA”: What is in it for Labor Rights?’ 
EJIL Talk (11 October 2018) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-renegotiated-nafta-what-is-in-it-for-labor-rights/> 
Accessed 20th May 2019. See also: Christopher A. Guerreiro ‘Strengthened IP protection under the USMCA: 
Extensions to data protection and patent-term restoration headline forthcoming changes to Canadian law’ (2018) 
<https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/cef9e6cb/strengthened-ip-protection-under-
the-usmca-extensions-to-data-protection-and-patent-term-restoration-headline-forthcoming-changes-to-
canadian-law> Accessed 20 May 2019. Clay R. Fuller, ‘An underlooked bright spot in NAFTA 2.0: A unified 
front against corruption’ (2018) <http://www.aei.org/publication/underlooked-bright-spot-nafta-2-anti-
corruption/> Accessed 15 April 2019. See also: Victoria Gaytan ‘The USMCA and its new anti-corruption 
provisions’ (Global Americans, 19 October 2018) <https://theglobalamericans.org/2018/10/the-usmca-and-its-
new-anti-corruption-provisions/> Accessed 15 April 2019. 
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This paper sets out to analyse the Anti-corruption measures in the USMCA. It begins with a 
discussion on the nature and effects of corruption in international trade. This is followed by a 
thorough consideration of the regulatory responses to the threat of corruption in the multilateral 
rulemaking order. In this respect, the paper considers the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
and the 2003 United Nations Convention against corruption.  
Having examined the nature of broader multilateral controls on corruption, the third section 
considers the emergent but interesting trend of anti-corruption regulation through international 
trade agreements. This section also evaluates the USMCA Anti-corruption provisions which 
set out a number of commitments for its signatories on corruption. It is argued here that the 
USMCA provides clear commitments on corruption and creates the conditions for a unified, 
trilateral front against corruption that may be of potential benefit to its signatories.  
II. Corruption and International Trade: An Overview 
Corruption, defined as the ‘abuse of entrusted power for private gain’6 is widely perceived as 
one of the greatest obstacles to the economic, political, and social development of developed 
and developing countries alike.7 Current figures suggest that the overall cost of corruption to 
the global economy equals more than five percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
which translates into US$ 3.6 trillion, with over US$ 1 trillion paid out in bribes annually.8 
Much of this activity manifests in international trade and investment where the real impact of 
corruption remains hotly debated but nonetheless recognised.9 Corruption in the international 
trading regime manifests through a number of practices including the bribery of foreign public 
officials and the embezzlement of property.10  
At its simplest, bribery involves the offer or acceptance of forms of financial inducement in 
exchange for an illicit advantage.11 In international commerce, bribery occurs in several forms 
but is said to be most common at the customs border where officials demand and receive 
varying sums from corporations and private traders to facilitate the transfer or movement of 
 
6 Transparency International ‘What is corruption’ (2019) <https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption> 
Accessed 20th February 2018.  
7 OECD, ‘The rationale for fighting corruption’ (2014) <https://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/49693613.pdf> 
Accessed 20th February 2019.  
8 Stephen Johnson ‘corruption is costing the global economy $3.6 billion dollars every year’ (2018) 
<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/12/the-global-economy-loses-3-6-trillion-to-corruption-each-year-
says-u-n> Accessed 21st March 2019.  
9 Some studies note that corruption serves as ‘grease’ to oil the wheels and can allow firms to overcome 
cumbersome regulations, by providing underpaid bureaucrats with incentives to perform and so improving 
allocative efficiency. See: Pushan Dutt, Daniel Traça ‘corruption and its impact on trade: Extortion or evasion?’ 
Vox (25 June 2009) <> Accessed 28th February 2019. Other studies emphasise the negative impact of corruption 
which often serves as a form of distortionary taxation which reduces allocative efficiency via lost revenues for 
government and the increased transaction costs, uncertainty, and unenforceable contracts which hamper business 
activity. See: Sandra Sequiera ‘Doing business with corruption’ (2016) <https://www.theigc.org/blog/doing-
business-with-corruption/> Accessed 1st March 2018.  
10 There are other forms of corruption such as Trading in Influence and Illicit Enrichment. However, transactional 
bribery and financial embezzlement are said to be the most prevalent form. See: Cecily Rose, International Anti-
corruption Norms: Their Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal Systems (Oxford University Press, 2015) 7. 
See also:  
11 Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, ‘corruption and the WTO Legal System’ (2009) 43 J. World Trade 737, 740-
741.  
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goods and services.12 Besides the ‘petty’ forms described above, bribery can also occur on a 
grand scale and may involve the transfer of pecuniary benefits to senior public officials within 
a given geographical area to alter or reduce taxation liabilities, turn a blind eye to illegal 
activities and/or ensure access to lucrative contracts and exemptions from normal 
administrative formalities.13  
Nothing illustrates the grand-scale bribery described above than the recent Rolls Royce scandal 
which saw the British corporate giant fined by regulators for the bribery of foreign public 
officials.14 Rolls Royce’s woes began after it was revealed to have made illicit payments over 
many years to public officials in seven Asian countries including China, India, Thailand and 
Indonesia to secure access to lucrative export contracts.15  
Cases of transnational bribery can also be seen in the Siemens scandal in which the German 
multinational company was fined over $800 million by American regulators under the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) for making approximately 4238 illegal payments to foreign 
public officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas totalling 
approximately over $1.4 billion.16 Practices of this sort, if normalised, can induce adverse 
economic, political and social costs including an increase in the cost of doing business, a 
reduction in trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows and ultimately, the erosion of 
public trust in institutions, businesses and governments.17  
Alongside bribery, embezzlement is another common form of corrupt conduct in international 
commerce.18 This involves the misappropriation of property or funds legally entrusted to 
another in their formal position as guardian or agent.19 Like bribery, embezzlement and 
misappropriation in international commerce is most prevalent at the border where goods and 
properties are often diverted with serious costs to exporters and importers alike.20  
 
12 Marie Chêne ‘corruption at borders’ (2018), 9 <https://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-at-borders.pdf> 
Accessed 25th March 2018. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Rob Evans, David Pegg and Holly Watt ‘Rolls Royce to pay £671m over bribery claims’ The Guardian (London 
16 January 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/16/rolls-royce-to-pay-671m-over-bribery-
claims> Accessed 1 March 2019.  
15 John Moylan ‘Rolls-Royce apologises after £671m bribery settlement’ BBC News (London 18 January 2017) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-38644114> Accessed 3 March 2019.  
16Trace International, ‘Trace Compendium: Siemens AG’ (2019) 
<https://www.traceinternational.org/TraceCompendium/Detail/124?class=casename_searchresult&type=1> 
Accessed 2 March 2019. See also: Bertrand Venard ‘Lessons from the Massive Siemens corruption Scandal one 
decade later’ The Conversation (13 December 2018) <http://theconversation.com/lessons-from-the-massive-
siemens-corruption-scandal-one-decade-later-108694> Accessed 13 February 2019.  
17 Export.gov ‘corruption’ (2018) <https://www.export.gov/article?id=corruption> Accessed 20 February 2019.  
18 Cecily Rose, International Anti-corruption Norms: Their Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal Systems 
(Oxford University Press, 2015) 7. See also: Marie Chêne ‘corruption at borders’ (2018), 9 
<https://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-at-borders.pdf> Accessed 25th March 2018. 
19 United Nations Convention against corruption (adopted 11 December 2003, entered into force 14 December 
2005) 2349 UNTS 41 (UNCAC). Article 17.  
20 Marie Chêne ‘corruption at borders’ (2018), 9 <https://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-at-borders.pdf> 
Accessed 25th March 2018. 
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III. Regulating Corruption in the Multilateral Legal Order 
Rising concern about the negative consequences of corruption in international trade and 
commerce has unsurprisingly inspired a number of regulatory responses at the multilateral 
level. One example is the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, an international treaty created under the auspices of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1997.21 Current 
signatories of the convention which include OECD member states like the United States and 
non-member states such as China, account for over two-thirds of the world’s exports and almost 
ninety percent of total foreign direct investment outflows, making the OECD Convention an 
important instrument in the fight against cross-border corruption.22  
Substantively, the Convention attempts to regulate bribery in international business 
transactions through the codification of minimum standards to be adopted by contracting 
parties. Its most important prescriptions include a mandatory requirement for signatories to 
criminalise the supply or active side of bribery where a person or entity offers, promises or 
gives a bribe to another, mostly a public official, to secure an illicit advantage (active bribery).23 
Signatories are also obliged to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions as a 
deterrent against bribery in business transactions.24  
The Convention also requires signatories to investigate and prosecute cases of bribery25 and to 
provide prompt legal assistance to other countries investigating foreign bribery allegations.26 
The coverage of the convention further extends to the internal operations of private actors. In 
this regard, the Convention codifies inter alia a requirement for signatories to adopt measures 
regarding the maintenance of books and records, financial statement disclosures, and sound 
accounting standards for private sector organisations.27 Notwithstanding the important 
provisions codified in the Convention, questions remain about its efficacy in the fight against 
corruption. 
One concern relates to the parameters and coverage of the Convention.28 As its official title 
indicates, the OECD Convention applies only to the bribery of foreign public officials in 
international business transactions; it does not extend to other forms of corruption such as the 
bribery of private sector officials, financial embezzlement and misappropriation not to mention 
 
21Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and 
Related Documents (Adopted by the Negotiating Conference on 21 November 1997, entered into force 15 
February 1999) (1998) 37 ILM 1.  
22 Emil Bolongaita ‘Mandate Without Means: Strengthening the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’ (2017), 1 
<https://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/Integrity-Forum-2017-Bolongaita-oecd-anti-bribery-convention.pdf> 
Accessed 2 March 2019.  
23 OECD Convention (n 21) Article 1 and 2. See also: Indira Carr and Opi Outhwaite ‘The OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention Ten Years on’ (2008) 1 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 3, 7.  
24 Ibid Article 3.  
25 Ibid Article 5. 
26 Ibid Article 9. 
27 Ibid Article 8. See also: Andrew Tyler ‘Enforcing Enforcement: Is the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s Peer 
Review Effective’ (2011) 43 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev 137, 142. 
28 Cristina Sambrook ‘The UN Convention against corruption: A Step forward from the OECD Convention: Pluses 
and Minuses from a Comparative Perspective’ (2006) 2 Romanian J. Int'l L. 74, 75. 
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illicit enrichment, abuse of functions and trading in influence which are also common in the 
international political and economic space.29  
A second, related limitation concerns the Convention’s exclusive focus on the active or supply-
side of bribery under which a person or entity offers, promises or gives a bribe, as contrasted 
with the demand or passive side which involves the act of soliciting or receiving bribes by 
public officials and others in positions of power.30 To be sure, there are sound policy reasons 
for regulating the supply-side of bribery.31 Yet, it is unclear whether targeting the supply of 
illicit funds is enough to address the overall challenge of bribery in international commerce 
which often involves the demand, solicitation and acceptance of financial inducements by 
persons in positions of power and influence.32  
Besides the narrow and parochial scope of the Convention, there are also concerns about the 
adequacy of the rules set forth within the document. As Tyler notes, the OECD Convention is 
characterised by wholly generic and unspecific rules which are not self-executing and therefore 
depend on the goodwill of signatories.33 This leaves a residual risk that the norms enshrined in 
the Convention may be transposed into national law in an uncoordinated and inconsistent way, 
which may ultimately undermine the letter and spirit of the agreement.  
Alongside the substantive and normative limitations highlighted above, the Convention also 
faces issues of compliance and implementation. As several studies have indicated, the OECD 
Convention suffers from a serious compliance deficit even amongst its most renowned 
signatories. Although some signatories like the United States pursue vigorous enforcement of 
the provisions of the treaty, there are nonetheless, numerous laggards.34 This was graphically 
revealed in a 2018 report by the advocacy group, Transparency International (TI) which noted 
that only seven of the 44 signatories to the Convention had actively enforced cases of bribery 
and corruption within their domestic legal systems with the remaining 37 signatories including 
important exporters like China, Canada and Mexico showing either limited or weak 
enforcement patterns.35  
The extent of free-riding is perhaps unsurprising since the Convention provides neither an 
enforcement nor dispute resolution mechanism under which free-riding signatories can, in 
principle, be held to account. To be sure, the OECD Convention provides for a fairly rigorous 
 
29 Ibid.  
30Ibid. see also Andrew Tyler ‘Enforcing Enforcement: Is the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s Peer Review 
Effective’ (2011) 43 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev 137, 146. See also: International Monetary Fund ‘OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions’ (2001), 6 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/gov/2001/eng/091801.pdf> Accessed 20 March 2019.  
31 This includes the belief that Bribery is likely to be controlled by effectively cutting out the supply of illicit funds 
and resources by multinational corporations in their target destinations Andrew Tyler ‘Enforcing Enforcement: Is 
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s Peer Review Effective’ (2011) 43 Geo.Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 137, 147.  
32 Indeed, Steven Salbu has argued that regulating the demand side of the Bribery transaction may be an effective 
and desirable policy solution. See Steven Salbu ‘A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change and 
Transnational Bribery’ (2000) 33(3) Cornell International Law Journal 658, 672.  
33 Tyler (n27).  
34 Christine E. Dryden ‘Exploring the Promise and Potential of a WTO Anti-corruption Treaty’ (2016) 79 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 249, 251.  
35 According to the Transparency International Report. China and Mexico show weak enforcement patterns whilst 
Canada on the other hand shows a rather limited one. See: Transparency International ‘Exporting corruption – 
Progress report 2018: Assessing enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’ (2018), 10 
<https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/exporting_corruption_2018> Accessed 20th April 2019.  
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monitoring process led by the Anti-Bribery working group.36 However, this process merely 
identifies weaknesses in compliance and does not enforce or sanction free-riders.37 Together, 
these raise deep concerns about the adequacy of the OECD Convention in the fight against 
corruption.  
The regulation of transnational corruption is by no means limited to the OECD Convention, 
other instruments like the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) have been 
enacted for exactly the same reason. The UN Convention which is signed by over 180 
countries, constitutes, unlike its OECD counterpart, a genuinely global, legally binding 
instrument on corruption and other related matters.38  
The UN Convention arose, in part, from the deficiencies of the OECD Convention and a 
recognition amongst UN member states of the significant scale of corruption in the global 
political and economic order.39 With this in mind, the UN Convention codifies a number of 
anti-corruption measures to be transposed, by signatories, into domestic law.  
These include a requirement for contracting states to adopt and maintain rules and codes of 
ethics relating to the conduct of public officials.40 Signatories are also required to ensure the 
existence of independent anti-corruption bodies capable of implementing, coordinating and 
overseeing anti-corruption policies.41 Other substantive measures include transparency in 
public procurement,42 the establishment of merit-based systems for the selection of civil 
servants43 and transparency in the funding of political organisations and activities among 
others.44 
More interesting though, are the provisions of the UNCAC on the criminalisation of corrupt 
practices under which signatories are obliged to take action against a wide range of criminal 
activity than that provided by the OECD Convention. Conduct proscribed in the UN 
Convention includes the bribery of public and private sector officials,45 financial embezzlement 
and misappropriation,46 trading in influence,47 abuse of functions,48 illicit enrichment49 and the 
 
36 The mechanism involves a comprehensive assessment of the conformity of a country's anti-bribery laws with 
the OECD Convention. This is followed by intensive on-site visits to the examined country with key actors from 
government, business, trade unions and civil society to assess how effective that country's anti-foreign bribery 
laws are in practice. The on-site examination team is led by representatives of two member countries of the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Working Group. For more information, See: Nathan Jensen and Edmund Malesky ‘Nonstate Actors 
and Compliance with International Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’ 
(2018) 72(1) International Organization 33-69 
37ibid.  
38 Ophelie Brunelle-Quraishi ‘Assessing the Relevancy and Efficacy of the United Nations Convention against 
corruption: A Comparative Analysis’ (2011) 2(1) Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law 101, 
106. 
39 Ibid at 105.  
40 UN Convention (n19) Article 8.  
41 Ibid at Article 6.  
42 Ibid at Article 9.  
43 Ibid at Article 7.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid at Articles 15 and 21 respectively.  
46 Ibid at Articles 17 and 22.  
47 Ibid at Article 18.  
48 Ibid at Article 19. 
49 Ibid at Article 20. 
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laundering of the proceeds of crime among others.50 The Convention also prescribes certain 
measures relating to the prosecution and enforcement of corrupt practices,51 protection of 
whistle-blowers52 and witnesses,53 as well as the provision of remedies for victims of 
corruption.54 It further codifies measures relating to international cooperation55 against 
corruption and a revolutionary chapter on asset recovery.56  
At face value, the UN Convention constitutes a far more comprehensive regulatory response 
than its OECD counterpart. As highlighted above, its provisions extend beyond the parochial 
offence of bribery which is the exclusive focus of the OECD treaty, making it a more inclusive, 
normative framework against corruption both in the public and private sphere. Yet, the 
convention is not without shortcomings and limitations.  
One limitation is the ambiguity of certain provisions in the Convention which makes it difficult 
for a fair-minded observer to determine what type of action is being sought and how such action 
might be implemented in practice.57 This is the case for provisions calling for the establishment 
of an adequate supervisory framework for financial institutions,58 promotion of transparency 
among private entities,59 and the prevention of the misuse of procedures regulating private 
entities.60 Although this is counterbalanced by more specific and concrete language in other 
respects, one cannot escape the view that more precise language is desirable for a treaty that 
aspires to universal application.  
Another limitation is the ambition of the convention and that of its provisions. For instance, 
only five of the eleven articles on the criminalisation of corrupt practices in the convention 
impose strict and mandatory obligations on state parties.61 The remaining six which cover more 
insidious conduct such as the passive bribery of foreign public officials, bribery and 
embezzlement in the private sector,62 trading in influence, abuse of functions and illicit 
 
50 Ibid at Article 23. See for a broader discussion: Cecily Rose, International Anti-corruption Norms: Their 
Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal Systems (Oxford University Press, 2015) 109. 
51 Ibid at Article 30.  
52 Ibid at Article 33. 
53 Ibid at Article 32. 
54 Ibid at Article 35. 
55 Ibid at Article 37 and 43.  
56 Ibid at Chapter V. 
57 Michael Bryane, ‘What Does the UN Convention on corruption Teach Us About 
International Regulatory Harmonisation?’ (2003), 9 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=512082> Accessed 20th April 2019.  
58 UN Convention (n19) Article 14 
59 Ibid at Article 12 
60 Ibid.  
61 Cecily Rose, International Anti-corruption Norms: Their Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal Systems 
(Oxford University Press, 2015) 108. 
62 The fact that the convention does not make private sector bribery and embezzlement a mandatory obligation 
speaks volumes about the ambition of the document since the line between public and private sector bribery are 
blurred in many countries especially in the context of globalisation, outsourcing etal. See: Antonio Argandona 
‘The United Nations Convention against corruption and its impact on International Companies’ (2007) 74 Journal 
of Business Ethics 481, 490.  
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enrichment, are couched in weak, soft and non-mandatory terms, meaning that state parties are 
at liberty not to take action in respect of these practices.63  
A further controversy relates to the widespread use of so-called safeguard or qualified clauses 
in ways that potentially reduce the relevance and significance of a number of provisions.64 One 
example is Article 23 on the laundering of the proceeds of crime which provides inter alia that 
parties shall, ‘subject to the basic concepts of its legal system’, criminalise the ‘acquisition, 
possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds 
of crime.’65  
To the ordinary eye, the above may constitute a welcome attempt to address the use of the 
proceeds of crime. However, the provision is undoubtedly couched in language which allows 
the possibility that the tenets of a party’s legal system may be invoked as justification for non-
implementation.66 
The above challenges arise even before considering the issues of monitoring and enforcement 
which are supposedly central to any legislative or regulatory instrument.67 On the issue of 
monitoring, the UN Convention unlike its OECD counterpart operates a rather obscure review 
mechanism, created six years after the adoption of the Convention.68 This mechanism is based 
on a much criticised three-stage assessment.69 The first stage consists of a self-assessment 
process under which signatories are invited to examine their own compliance with an aspect of 
the Convention.70 External scrutiny of this self-assessment exercise by other actors such as 
civil society organisations or academic experts is not required, meaning that there are no 
independent evaluations of the accuracy of these self-assessment reports.71  
Following the self-assessment exercise is a peer review process where two peer countries 
appointed by the secretariat of the UNCAC assess the contents of the self-assessment 
checklist.72 Upon completion of this review, a report is produced by the reviewers, detailing 
 
63 Cecily Rose, International Anti-corruption Norms: Their Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal Systems 
(Oxford University Press, 2015) 108.  
64 Antonio Argandona ‘The United Nations Convention against corruption and its impact on International 
Companies’ (2007) 74 Journal of Business Ethics 481, 490.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Cecily Rose, International Anti-corruption Norms: Their Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal Systems 
(Oxford University Press, 2015) 108. 
67 Ophelie Brunelle-Quraishi ‘Assessing the Relevancy and Efficacy of the United Nations Convention against 
corruption: A Comparative Analysis’ (2011) 2(1) Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law 101, 
133.  
68 For a broader overview of the negotiations leading to the creation of a monitoring system. See: Matti Joutsen 
and Adam Graycar ‘When Experts and Diplomats Agree: Negotiating Peer Review of the UN Convention against 
corruption’ (2012) 18 Global Governance 425.  
69 Fritz Heimann, Gillian Dell, Gabor Bathory ‘UN Convention against corruption Progress Report 2013’ 
(2013),10<https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/un_convention_against_corruption_progress_re
port_2013> Accessed 14 April 2019. 
70 UNCAC Coalition ‘UNCAC Review Mechanism’ (2018) <https://uncaccoalition.org/en_US/uncac-
review/uncac-review-mechanism/> Accessed 17 April 2019. 
71U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre ‘UNCAC in a nutshell’ (2017), 3 
<https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3769-uncac-in-a-nutshell.pdf> Accessed 20 March 2019.  
72 Ibid.  
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any challenges, successes, good practices, observations and recommendations for future 
implementation.73 
In practice, these reports are rarely ever published and are only issued with the consent of the 
reviewed state.74 Worse, there are no follow-up mechanisms to determine whether signatories 
are actually implementing the recommendations of the country reviews75 nor are there explicit 
enforcement mechanisms within the ambit of the UN Convention that can be applied to 
persistent cases of non-compliance.76 This leaves the Convention with a largely obscure and 
non-transparent monitoring system and a non-existent enforcement mechanism.  
IV. Trade Agreements77 as Emergent Instruments in the Regulation of 
Transnational Corruption: USMCA as an Example 
Given the shortcomings of multilateral instruments, states are increasingly addressing the 
challenge of corruption through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).78 The use of FTAs in this 
regard is most visible in the trade policy of a number of actors including the United States and 
the European Union.79  
For instance, the US first incorporated anti-corruption provisions into its trade deals with 
Singapore (2003) and Australia (2004), although these were commingled with other good 
 
73 Ibid.  
74 Fritz Heimann, Gillian Dell, Gabor Bathory ‘UN Convention against corruption Progress Report 2013’ 
(2013),10<https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/un_convention_against_corruption_progress_re
port_2013> Accessed 14 April 2019. See also: Ophelie Brunelle-Quraishi ‘Assessing the Relevancy and Efficacy 
of the United Nations Convention against corruption: A Comparative Analysis’ (2011) 2(1) Notre Dame Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 101, 138.  
75 Fritz Heimann, Gillian Dell, Gabor Bathory ‘UN Convention against corruption Progress Report 2013’ (2013), 
6<https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/un_convention_against_corruption_progress_report_201
3> Accessed 14 April 2019.  
76 Hannes Hechler, Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, Lucy Koechlin and Dominic Morris ‘Can UNCAC address grand 
corruption? A political economy analysis of the UN Convention against corruption and its implementation in three 
countries’ (2011) U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre Report, 24 <https://www.u4.no/publications/can-uncac-
address-grand-corruption.pdf> Accessed 20 March 2019.  
77 At a basic level, FTAs are legally enforceable agreements between states that remove or reduce tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade and investment within the jurisdictional boundaries of the contracting parties. The scope 
and ambition of these agreements vary dramatically. Less complex agreements focus solely on trade facilitation 
measures such as the liberalisation of tariffs and custom duties while the more comprehensive agreements pursue 
deeper integration in wider areas including investment protection, intellectual property and government 
procurement among others. Comprehensive FTAs, in many instances, also allow for deeper cooperation among 
signatories in vast areas such as human rights, labour and environmental protection, sustainable development, 
labour mobility, data protection and anti-corruption where the rulemaking of multilateral organisations remains 
largely limited. See: Dani Rodrik ‘What Do Trade Agreements Really Do?’ (2018) 32(2) Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 73,76. 
78Iza Lejárraga ‘Multilateralising Regionalism’ (2013) OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 152, 8 
<http://www.oecdilibrary.org/trade/multilateralising-regionalism_5k44t7k99xzq-en> Accessed 12 April 2019. 
See also: Alina Mungiu-Pippidi ‘Anti-corruption provisions in EU Free Trade and Investment Agreements: 
Delivering on Clean trade’ (2018), 16 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603867/EXPO_STU(2018)603867_EN.pdf> 
Accessed 3 March 2019. 
79 Ibid.  
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governance objectives such as transparency.80 More standalone anti-corruption Chapters first 
appeared in the FTAs with Morocco (2004) and Central American Countries (DR-CAFTA) 
(2005) and have been rolled out more generally ever since including in the TPP.81  
The EU has also included similar provisions in its FTAs such as the association agreements 
with the Ukrainian republic,82 and Moldova.83 The draft EU-Mexico FTA also contains a 
dedicated anti-corruption Chapter that commits the parties to far reaching action against 
corruption.84  
This emerging practice is also reflected in the USMCA which codifies a number of anti-
corruption provisions in Chapter 27 of the agreement.85 Substantively, the Chapter begins with 
a stated commitment that all parties will ‘prevent and combat bribery and corruption in 
international trade and investment.’86 The signatories also reiterate their support for a host of 
multilateral instruments including the UN Convention against corruption and the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention amongst others.87 Following this are a host of legislative, administrative 
and promotional measures to be implemented by the signatories.88  
The most significant legislative measures in Chapter 27 of the USMCA include an obligation 
by the parties to criminalise bribery and corruption in international trade. To this end, the 
signatories commit to adopt or maintain legislative disciplines against the offer of bribes to 
public officials and the solicitation or acceptance by public officials of bribes.89  
Alongside the provisions on bribery, the USMCA also requires parties to take legislative action 
against the embezzlement, misappropriation or diversion90 of property, funds, securities or any 
other thing of value entrusted to a public official by virtue of their position.91 This provision 
clearly calls on signatories to proscribe the embezzlement or diversion of property and is 
clearly modelled on the UN Convention which also regulates the embezzlement of property.  
 
80 Matthew Jenkins ‘Anti-corruption and Transparency Provisions in Trade Agreements’ (2017), 8 
<https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Anti-corruption-and-transparency-provisions-
in-trade-agreements-2018.pdf> Accessed 11 April 2019. 
81Iza Lejárraga ‘Multilateralising Regionalism’ (2013) OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 152, 17 
<http://www.oecdilibrary.org/trade/multilateralising-regionalism_5k44t7k99xzq-en> Accessed 12 April 2019. 
82 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, 
Official Journal of the European Union L161/3, 29.5.2014.  
83 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic 
of Moldova, Official Journal of the European Union L260/4, 30.8.2014.  
84New EU-Mexico agreement ‘The agreement in principle’ (2018) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/april/tradoc_156791.pdf> Accessed 20 April 2019. See also:  
85 Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada (2018) 
<https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-
between> Accessed 20 March 2019. 
86 USMCA (n85) Article 27.2.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Collmann Griffin, Richard Mojica, Marc Alain Bohn ‘Takeaways from the Anti-corruption Chapter of the 
USMCA’ (The FCPA Blog, 9 January 2019) <http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2019/1/9/takeaways-from-the-anti-
corruption-chapter-of-the-usmca.html> Accessed 5 March 2019.  
89 USMCA (n85) Article 27.3. 
90 The term diversion is used to give effect to Canadian Law on Embezzlement or misappropriation. See: USMCA 
(n85) Article 27.3.  
91 USMCA (n85) Article 27.3 
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Other legislative measures enshrined in the USMCA include an obligation for the contracting 
parties to adopt dissuasive sanctions against the above-mentioned offences92 and to prioritise 
the enforcement of Anti-corruption legislation within their domestic legal systems.93 In the 
latter regard, the parties commit to avoid ‘sustained or recurring courses of action or inaction’ 
which ultimately violate the tenets of the agreement – an unusually robust commitment for an 
anti-corruption treaty.94 
In addition to the legislative measures considered above, the USMCA also codifies a number 
of administrative measures. These include a requirement for the signatories to subject private 
entities to a host of governance objectives including the maintenance of books and records, 
financial statement disclosures, sound accounting and auditing practices and the prohibition of 
acts such as the creation of off-the-books accounts, the use of false documents and the 
intentional destruction of bookkeeping documents among others.95 These measures are clearly 
directed towards preventing the illicit use of business organisations as conduits for corrupt 
practices.  
Other measures of an administrative character include protections for whistle-blowers,96 the 
disallowance of tax deductibility for bribe payments97 and the adoption of policies and 
procedures to identify and manage conflicts of interest by public officials.98  
The coverage of the USMCA further extends to a range of promotional actions. In this regard, 
the agreement requires its signatories to raise awareness among domestic public officials of 
relevant anti-corruption laws99 and to promote the active participation of the voluntary and 
business sectors in anti-corruption efforts, including through public information and education 
programs.100 This latter requirement channels networked-based theories of governance which 
accentuate the role of private and nongovernmental actors in the performance of public 
functions.101 Yet, more pertinently, it recognises that the fight against corruption transcends 
the public sector and is unlikely to succeed without the co-optation of actors from the private 
and voluntary spheres.  
Beyond the promotional elements considered above, the USMCA also requires its signatories 
to strengthen international cooperation among their respective law enforcement agencies in 
tackling cross-border corruption.102 In this regard, the parties note the significant promise 
behind ‘sharing their diverse experience and best practices in developing, implementing, and 
 
92 Ibid.  
93 USMCA (n85) at Article 27.6. 
94 ibid.  
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 ibid at Article 27.3 
98 Ibid at Article 27.4.  
99 Ibid at Article 27.5 
100 Ibid  
101 Tom Dedeurwaerdere, The Contribution of Network Governance to Sustainable Development (Institut du 
Développement Durable et des Relations Internationals 2005) 
<https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/import/publications/id_0504_dedeurwaerdere.pdf> Accessed 20 May 
2019; Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘EU Rules Beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External 
Governance in European Politics’ (2009) 16(6) Journal of European Public Policy 791, 795. 
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enforcing anticorruption laws and policies.’103 The parties also commit to ‘consider 
undertaking technical cooperation activities, including training programs.’104 
On paper, this allows all three signatories to work towards more integrated systems for rule-
making and enforcement.105 Yet, the more profound benefit of such cooperation is likely to be 
for Mexico which has traditionally lagged behind its North American neighbours in the 
enforcement of bribery and corruption laws106 and is deemed to be ‘highly corrupt’ in reputable 
benchmarks such as the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.107 For 
Mexico, such benefit may come through the transfer of best practices and technical expertise 
in rulemaking and enforcement from the experienced agencies of its North American 
neighbours.108  
Alongside the measures considered above, the USMCA, also provides for a means of 
enforcement of its Anti-corruption provisions. This is to be done through the specialised 
dispute settlement mechanism enshrined in Chapter 31 of the agreement under which 
contracting parties may submit disputes to a bespoke arbitral panel.109  
There are, however, certain limits on the applicability of the dispute settlement mechanism to 
the Chapter 27 measures.110 For instance, the signatories have explicitly excluded disputes 
arising from a party’s failure to enforce laws adopted or maintained pursuant to the agreement. 
Simply put, a USMCA signatory cannot initiate a dispute under the agreement as a result of 
another’s failure to enforce its Anti-corruption laws.  
To a cynical mind, this might read like an abject surrender of a powerful weapon against 
corruption.111 However, it is worth noting that the parties may have endorsed such a proviso to 
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forestall the risk of vexatious disputes or to preserve the sovereign right of a state to enforce its 
laws.112  
More so, the carve-out does not preclude the distinct possibility that a party may still have 
recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism if it considers a trade or investment related 
measure of another party to be inconsistent with an obligation arising under the Chapter or if it 
considers a party to have failed in its obligation to enact or maintain regulatory measures in 
relation to the forms of corruption covered under the agreement.113  
Taken together, the USMCA provides clear commitments on Anti-Corruption and uniquely 
allows for the policing of its prescriptions via an explicit dispute resolution mechanism. The 
agreement also commits the signatories to enhanced cooperation in rulemaking and 
enforcement. This is likely to inspire a unified, trilateral front against corruption that is of 
practical benefit to the three signatories.  
V. Concluding Remarks 
The corrosive impact of corruption in the global political and economic order has inspired a 
number of regulatory responses at the global level including the 1997 OECD Anti-bribery 
Convention and the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption. Decades after the adoption of 
these instruments, compliance levels remain low, raising questions about their efficacy.  
Increasingly also, nation states are turning to free trade agreements to address governance 
challenges such as corruption given the limitations of broader multilateral rules. The USMCA 
is part of this rising trend. This paper considered the Anti-corruption provisions in Chapter 27 
of the USMCA. It argued that the Chapter 27 measures provide clear commitments on Anti-
corruption, ranging from the criminalisation of bribery and embezzlement to the co-optation of 
actors from the private and voluntary sectors in the fight against corruption. The paper also 
argued that the USMCA creates the conditions for proactive cooperation amongst the 
signatories in Anti-corruption regulation and enforcement which may prove helpful to 
addressing the deep challenges posed by corruption.  
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